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1.  Introduction 
 
 
In the second half of 2008, two events occurred that are, individually and together, highly 
significant for the future of global health.  First, in August 2008 the World Health Organization’s 
Commission on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) released its final report (Commission on 
Social Determinants of Health, 2008; for a brief summary, see Marmot & Friel, 2008; Marmot, 
Friel, Bell, Houweling, & Taylor, 2008).  The 19-member Commission, established in 2005, 
began its extraordinary report with the observation that: “Social injustice is killing people on a 
grand scale.”  The concepts of health equity and socioeconomic gradients in health were central 
to the Commission’s unequivocally normative analysis.  Health equity was defined with 
reference to the absence of systematic differences in health that are avoidable by reasonable 
action … and the Commission considered most such differences to be avoidable and therefore 
inequitable (Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2007, p. 1).  Socioeconomic 
gradients in health are disparities in health outcomes related to various indicators of social 
(dis)advantage; such gradients are ubiquitous, not only between countries but also within them.  
The Commission’s perspective on such gradients is worth quoting at length:   
The poor health of the poor, the social gradient in health within countries, and the marked 
health inequities between countries are caused by the unequal distribution of power, 
income, goods, and services, globally and nationally, the consequent unfairness in the 
immediate, visible circumstances of people’s lives – their access to health care, schools, 
and education, their conditions of work and leisure, their homes, communities, towns, or 
cities – and their chances of leading a flourishing life. This unequal distribution of health-
damaging experiences is not in any sense a ‘natural’ phenomenon but is the result of a toxic 
combination of poor social policies and programmes, unfair economic arrangements, and 
bad politics  (Commission on Social Determinants of Health, 2008, p. 1) 
 
Importantly, the report further recognized that “[i]mplementation of the Commission’s 
recommendations is critically dependent upon changes in the functioning of the global economy” 
(p. 76, and see generally chapters 3, 11 and 15).   
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 Second, in September 2008 a financial crisis precipitated by the collapse of the US sub-
prime mortgage market, which began in 2007, spread rapidly around the world.  Stock markets 
plunged, high-income economies and those of many developing countries were plunged into 
recession, and governments pledged literally trillions of dollars in direct subsidies and credit 
guarantees to rescue collapsing financial institutions, including some of the largest in the world.  
One immediate outcome was to bring home to people in high-income countries what many 
elsewhere in the world had known from bitter experience for at least a generation: their lives 
could be transformed and their livelihoods wiped out by events in financial markets over which 
they had absolutely no control, and whose workings they did not understand.  
In an October 2008 speech at the UN General Assembly (Chan, 2008), WHO Director-
General Margaret Chan was forthright in linking the two problématiques.  Noting that The 
Economist, in a generally laudatory review, had commented that the Commission “seems, at 
times, to be baying at the moon when it attacks global imbalances in the distribution of power 
and money,” she asked in reply: “Let me ask you: how does this statement sound right now, with 
the global financial system on the verge of collapse? Is it not right for health and multiple other 
sectors to ask for some changes in the functioning of the global economy?” 
 It is too soon to assess the effects of CSDH’s activities; my aims here are far more 
modest.  “Financialization” has been identified as a dominant trend in the operation of many 
national economies, and especially the global economic system, over the past few decades 
(Epstein, 2005).  Because of the consequences of the operations of today’s financial markets for 
social determinants of health (SDH) – the conditions of life and work that make it easy for some 
people to lead long and healthy lives, but all but impossible for others -- I argue that those 
markets must be understood as forms of ‘governance’ in the context of global health, even 
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though they do not operate through institutional frameworks analogous to the World Trade 
Organization, and often do not require formal coordination.  The crisis of 2008 suggested new 
vulnerabilities, potentially along with new opportunities for building domestic political alliances 
in support of “redistribution, regulation and rights” as constraints on the operation of the market.1  
At the same time, both the earlier experience of developing countries with the caprices of 
financial markets and the crisis of 2008 suggest that policy outcomes must be understood in 
terms of the interplay of global flows of finance with domestic political allegiances that are 
themselves reflective of globalization.  
 
2.  The disciplinary role of financial markets: Disinvestment and crises  
 
A simple comparison suffices to indicate the extent of financialization worldwide.  While the 
total value of foreign direct investment flows (to build new production facilities or acquire 
existing assets) in 2007 was $1.8 trillion (United Nations Conference, 2008), the daily value of 
foreign exchange transactions on the world’s financial markets – a useful indication of the 
volume of global financial flows -- was estimated in 2007 at over $3.4 trillion (Bank for 
                                                 
1  The “three Rs” rubric was proposed in a paper by the Finnish social policy research Unit 
STAKES on social policy developments since the United Nations’ 1995 Social Summit in 
Copenhagen (Deacon, Ilva, Koivusalo, Ollila, & Stubbs, 2005).  It was adopted as a generic 
organizing principle for policy responses to globalization by one of the nine Knowledge 
Networks that supported the work of the Commission on Social Determinants of Health (Labonté 
et al., 2007). 
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International Settlements, 2008, p. 88).  What is noteworthy about this comparison is not only 
the vastly greater volume of portfolio investment, but also the speed with which financial assets 
can now be moved around the globe because of the interaction of advances in information 
processing and telecommunications technology. The global financial marketplace, however, did 
not ‘just happen’ as a serendipitous spinoff of the information revolution.  It must be understood 
as arising as well from factors including decisions by some of the world’s most powerful 
governments to deregulate (Helleiner, 1994; Girón & Correa, 1999), partly in order to gain a 
competitive advantage for their own financial services industries, and sustained insistence by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) that low- and middle-income countries reduce or remove 
controls on capital flows (Stiglitz, 2004).    
 As a result, investors have often been able to impose “implicit conditionalities” (Griffith-
Jones & Stallings, 1995) on developing countries, the effects of which are similar to those of the 
more familiar, and more extensively researched, explicit conditionalities attached to loans from 
the IMF and the World Bank (see e.g. Cheru, 1999; Milward, 2000; Babb, 2005).  As Sassen has 
pointed out, owners of mobile assets traded in financial markets “can now exercise the 
accountability functions associated with citizenship: they can vote governments’ economic 
policies in or out, they can force governments to take certain measures and not others” (Sassen, 
2003, p. 70; see generally Sassen, 1996).   
The most dramatic sanction backing up such implicit conditionalities is the prospect of 
financial crises triggered by rapid short-term capital outflows.  Notable examples of such crises 
occurred in Mexico in 1994-5, several south Asian countries in 1997-98, and Argentina in 2001-
02 – in each case driving down the value of national currencies relative to the US dollar by 50 
percent or more within a few months, and plunging millions of households into poverty and 
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economic insecurity.  In the Mexican case, immediate erosion of Mexicans’ purchasing power, 
apart from the wealthy and a minority of employees paid in US dollars (DePalma, 1995) , was 
compounded by wage reductions, restructuring of employment relations and public sector 
austerity measures needed to restore investor confidence (Dussel Peters, 2000; Cypher, 2001; 
Soederberg, 2004, p. 48-54).  In the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, Thailand’s and Korea’s 
currencies similarly lost about half their value, with even greater depreciation and more serious 
economic impacts in Indonesia (Martinez, 1998; Kittiprapas, Sanderatne, & Abeysekeera, 2006)  
Again, economic decline was disproportionately felt by the economically vulnerable, notably in 
the form of sharp declines in wages (World Bank, 2000,  chapter 2) – an outcome all but 
guaranteed by the greater mobility of capital, relative to labour, in the contemporary world 
economy.2   In Indonesia and Thailand, these effects were “exacerbated by the initial insistence 
of the IMF that governments return a fiscal surplus of 1 percent of GDP” (Hopkins, 2006, p. 354; 
see also Bullard, Bello, & Malhotra, 1998; Desai, 2003, p. 212-241).  In Korea, IMF loans were 
associated with what has been called an effective takeover of the country’s economy, involving 
drastic market-oriented restructuring that led to a short-term decline in growth, a quadrupling of 
unemployment and, arguably, a longer-term shift in income and bargaining power from labour to 
capital (Crotty & Lee, 2005a; Crotty & Lee, 2005b).   
                                                 
2  The World Bank’s observation that the crisis “demonstrated the flexibility of labor markets in 
developing countries” because wages rather than employment declined (World Bank, 2000, p. 
xi) is somehow less than reassuring, especially since “the average [Indonesian] household [was] 
found to have increased total household labour hours by 25 hours per week in response to the 
crisis” ((McKenzie, 2004, p. 720).  
 
7 
 
 Brazil provides an especially instructive case because of demonstrable effects on 
domestic social and economic policy. Investor concern about the stability of all developing 
country currencies in the wake of the south Asian crisis and subsequent Russian events early in 
1998 led to a selloff of Brazilian assets that forced a currency devaluation even though 
connections between Brazil’s economy, and the economic lives of most Brazilians, with events 
in south Asia or Russia were minimal (Gruben & Kiser, 1999; Goldfajn & Baig, 2000; Desai, 
2003, p. 136-155).  Subsequently, concern about the policies that might be adopted by the 
Workers’ Party (PT), which appeared likely to win the 2002 election, led major US financial 
institutions to warn clients against investing in Brazil, with some recommending rapid 
disinvestment (Santiso, 1999).  A Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Brazil between 2000 
and 2003 describes a remarkable correlation between the PT’s lead in opinion polls and the risk 
premium demanded on Brazilian government bonds (Goldfajn, 2003).  In order to assuage the 
concerns of foreign investors, in September 2002 all the presidential candidates agreed on the 
terms of an IMF lending package most of which would be disbursed after the election.   
 The noted development scholar Peter Evans describes the consequences as follows:  
“Having experienced a 40 percent fall in the value of Brazil's currency in the course of a few 
months,” the last stage of a longer-term decline that drove the Real from a value of R1.32/US$1 
in January 1999 to R3.46/US$1 in July 2002, that is to say shortly before the IMF 
announcement, the PT “chose to suffer low growth, high unemployment and flat levels of social 
expenditure rather than risk retribution from the global financial actors who constitute ‘the 
markets’” (Evans, 2005, p. 196, citation omitted; see also Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005; Amann & 
Baer, 2006, p. 221-223; Paiva, 2006; Koelble & Lipuma, 2006, p. 623-625).  Indeed, the 
Brazilian government not only kept interest rates high and inflation low but also ran an even 
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larger primary budget surplus (that is, a surplus before debt service obligations are taken into 
account) than demanded by the IMF.   
As in the south Asian case, the role of the IMF in Brazil suggests that understanding the 
influence of financial markets and institutions on SDH is likely to be hampered by too-rigid 
taxonomic distinctions between explicit and implicit conditionalities; these are best viewed as 
complementary elements, sometimes sequential and at other times contemporaneous, of a 
substantively coherent apparatus of governance that reflects the interests and priorities of the 
owners of financial assets.  Further, in the cases discussed as in other instances of rapid 
disinvestment, investors were behaving rationally given the ‘macroeconomic fundamentals’ of 
the countries in question, and the IMF was incorporating into its policy prescriptions the dogma 
of textbook macroeconomics and public finance.  The resulting power shift, identified by Sassen, 
was succinctly described by Michel Camdessus, then managing director of the IMF, in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the Mexican peso in 1994-95:  
“Countries that successfully attract large capital inflows must also bear in mind that their 
continued access to international capital is far from automatic, and the conditions attached 
to that access are not guaranteed. The decisive factor here is market perceptions: whether 
the country's policies are deemed basically sound and its economic future, promising. The 
corollary is that shifts in the market's perception of these underlying fundamentals can be 
quite swift, brutal, and destabilizing” (Camdessus, 1995).  
Camdessus’ observation is notable for its author as much as for its content, which is now widely 
acknowledged.   
Not all countries are equally exposed to such sanctions.  When assessing the risks of 
investing in high-income economies, investors care mainly about inflation and the size of the 
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government deficit or surplus.  For the so-called emerging market countries, which are regarded 
as less creditworthy, they pay attention as well to a much larger range of indicators (Mosley, 
2003).  One of the most accomplished investigators of how financial markets actually work  
therefore warns that “those societies most in need of egalitarian redistribution may have, in terms 
of external financial market pressures, the most difficulty achieving it” (Mosley, 2006, p. 90).  
As shown in section 4 of the chapter, foreign portfolio investors are not the only source of such 
pressures.     
 
3.  Financial crises and social determinants of health  
 
First, however, it may be useful to explain what all of this has to do with health.  Paluzzi and 
Farmer have succinctly summarized a point made at length in the CSDH final report, and by 
many other researchers (e.g. Yong Kim, Millen, Irwin, & Gershman, eds. 2000; Farmer, 2003), 
with their observation that “many of the most devastating problems that plague the daily lives of 
billions of people are problems that emerge from a single, fundamental source: the consequences 
of poverty and inequality” (Paluzzi & Farmer, 2005, p. 12).  The extent of these problems can be 
gauged from the fact that according to the most recent World Bank estimates, in 2005 1.4 billion 
people were living in extreme poverty -- defined as an income of  $1.25/day or less, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity, in 2005.  Roughly half the world’s people (3.1 billion) were living 
below a higher poverty line of $2.50/day (Chen & Ravallion, 2008). These figures reflect modest 
progress in reducing poverty over a period (1981-2005) during which the value of the world’s 
economic product quadrupled (Schrecker, Labonté, & De Vogli, 2008), and do not take into 
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account either the effects of rapid food price increases in 2007 or those of the financial crisis of 
2008. 
 Financial crises are likely to undermine health in the first instance by slowing or 
reversing economic growth, increasing poverty and economic insecurity both directly and 
indirectly.  Griffith-Jones & Gottschalk (2004) estimate the GDP losses from financial crises in 
Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and Turkey at $1.25 trillion 
over the period 1995-2002.  As an example of the damage done to household income by wage 
reductions and unemployment, an Argentine study found that after the currency collapse “78% of 
households surveyed experienc[ed] real income declines in 2002 and 63% suffer[ed] a real 
income fall of 20% or more” (McKenzie, 2004, p. 721). Poverty in Mexico increased drastically 
as a result of the 1994-95 crisis (Cypher, 2001, p. 32).  Comparing financial crises in 10 
countries, van der Hoeven & Lübker (2005) showed that employment consistently recovers more 
slowly than GDP in the aftermath, prolonging the damage to household incomes and well being.  
Impacts of financial crises may be worsened by austerity measures, which as noted earlier reduce 
public expenditures on health care and social protection, and by contractionary economic 
policies. In countries with substantial external debt burdens, a further issue arises from the fact 
that the value of external debt obligations denominated in dollars or other hard currency climbs 
with any devaluation, potentially creating further pressures for domestic austerity (Koelble & 
Lipuma, 2006).   
 Despite recent interest in SDH, relatively little research has worked through these 
channels of influence to document the actual health outcomes of financial crises.  In November, 
1998 representatives from developing countries identified financial crises as an obstacle to 
domestic policies aimed at increasing vaccination coverage among children (World Health 
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Organization, 1998).  A World Bank study identified increases in anemia among Mexican 
children and deteriorating indicators of maternal nutrition following financial crises in Indonesia, 
as well as reduced rates of school enrolment that might be damaging to longer-term economic 
opportunities (World Bank, 2001, p. 164-165). A review of social impacts of economic crises in 
Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam, drawing on data sources beyond the 
usual official and quasi-official statistical indicators, identified a range of impacts on SDH 
including increases in crime, child prostitution and violence against women, although both data 
availability and the severity of reported impacts varied widely across countries (McGee & Scott, 
2000).  A Korean national survey found substantial increases in morbidity, and decreases in 
health service utilization, following the 1997 currency crisis (Kim et al., 2003). A more recent 
summary of research on the economic crisis of 1997-98 in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
(Hopkins, 2006) described a reversal of past health gains and a deterioration in such indicators as 
undernutrition, household spending on health care, and public spending on health.  The 
deterioration appears to have been less severe and shorter lived in Malaysia, which explicitly 
rejected the neoliberal prescriptions of the IMF in favour of capital controls (see also Cornia, 
2006).  
Importantly, relying on evidence of short-term impacts on health and such variables as 
nutrition and school attendance is likely to lead to substantial underestimates of the long-term 
effects of financial crises, which may (e.g. in the case of childhood malnutrition or long-term 
damage to maternal health) be irreversible both within and across generations.  Importantly as 
well, the Brazilian example and the SDH perspective indicate that the operations of global 
financial markets are relevant to developing countries not only because of the damage done by 
financial crises, but also because of the constraints they may impose on the ability of national 
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and sub-national governments to implement the redistributive policies that are so desperately 
needed if such countries are to meet the basic health-related needs of their citizens.  At the same 
time, the analysis requires more texture, since the actions of foreign investors are not the only 
drivers of the dynamic that leads to immiserization by way of financial crises or their 
anticipation.  
 
4.  The disciplinary role of financial markets: Capital flight 
 
‘The markets’ are an abstraction.  Their verdict on a country’s policies is simply the resource-
weighted aggregation of choices made by asset owners and managers with broadly similar 
interests and motivations, including not only those in London, New York and Geneva but also an 
increasing number of rich households in many low- and middle-income countries.  As long ago 
as 1990, the then-emerging private banking industry was described by The Economist as 
“essentially the business of taking deposits from rich individuals living in the third world” 
(Anon, 1990).   Although most of the world’s so-called high net worth individuals (those owning 
more than $1 million in financial assets) still live in Europe, North America and the Asia-Pacific 
region, the fastest growth in both the number of such individuals and the amounts of wealth they 
held in 2005 and 2006 occurred in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America (Capgemini & 
Merrill Lynch, 2005; Capgemini & Merrill Lynch, 2006; Capgemini & Merrill Lynch, 2007).  
Indeed, globalization has rendered analytical distinctions between ‘international’ and domestic 
investors, in terms of their interests and opportunities for portfolio choice, increasingly tenuous.  
John Williamson, who codified the so-called Washington Consensus on development policy, 
recently underscored this point by commenting that “levying heavier taxes on the rich so as to 
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increase social spending that benefits disproportionately the poor” is conceptually attractive in 
Latin America, but “it would not be practical to push this very far, because too many of the Latin 
rich have the option of placing too many of their assets in Miami” (Williamson, 2004).  This is a 
sobering observation about a region with some of the world’s greatest inequalities in income and 
wealth, where even modest redistributive policies would do more to reduce poverty reduction 
than many years of robust economic growth (Paes de Barros et al., 2002; de Ferranti, Perry, 
Ferreira, & Walton, 2004).   
Williamson was describing capital flight: “mechanisms by which residents of a country 
seek to evade domestic social control over their assets by transferring them abroad” (Ndikumana 
& Boyce, 1998, p. 199; see also Beja, 2006, p. 265).  The appropriate definition of capital flight 
is a matter of some debate; an alternative definition refers to “illicit disguised expatriation of 
money by those resident or taxable within the country of origin” (Murphy, Christensen, Kapoor, 
Spencer, & Pak, 2007, p. 16).  This definition reflects the fact that a primary motivation for 
capital flight, although far from the only one, is tax avoidance or evasion.3  Although such illicit 
                                                 
3  The significance of this motivation is arguably reflected in the value of assets held in offshore 
in offshore financial centres (OFCs), perhaps the iconic institution of the global financial 
marketplace, which was estimated at $5-7 trillion in 2007 (Ramos, 2007) although for obvious 
reasons precision is elusive. In 2007, the most recent year for which figures are available at this 
writing, $740 billion worth of US securities, or 7.6 percent of the total value of all foreign 
holdings of US securities, were held by ‘residents’ of the tiny Cayman Islands, one of the more 
notorious OFCs.  Despite problems with the attribution of ownership, this serves as an indication 
of the importance of at least one OFC (Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, & Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2008, p. 10).  
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transactions4 are an important component of capital flight, and explain much of the difficulty in 
estimation, this definition is too restrictive (cf. Loungani & Mauro, 2001, p. 690): it would 
capture the dynamic identified by Williamson only if the transfers of assets to which he refers 
were illegal, and ultimately distracts attention from the problem of economic policy competition 
among jurisdictions in order to avoid perfectly legal relocation of hypermobile assets by their 
owners.     
The magnitude of capital flight and the problems it poses for social and economic policy 
are relevant to discussions of the SDH for several reasons.  As Williamson’s comments suggest, 
anticipation of capital flight may constrain redistributive policies and, in particular, limit 
opportunities for progressive taxation.  Capital flight deprives countries of financial resources 
that may be desperately needed for investment in their own economic development, often a 
necessary -- although not a sufficient -- condition for widely shared improvements in living 
standards.  Perhaps most pernicious is the relation between capital flight and the debt crises that 
began for many developing countries late in the 1970s, and often continue to plague them today 
despite belated and partial multilateral debt cancellation (Hurley, 2007).  In 1987, in what 
remains one of the most thoughtful discussions of how global financial markets figure in the 
larger transformation of the world’s economic system,5 economic historian Thomas Naylor 
concluded that: “There would be no ‘debt crisis’ without large-scale capital flight” (Naylor, 
1987, p. 370).  In the same year Rodriguez (1987), writing with specific reference to several 
Latin American countries, elaborated on the regressive distributional effects of capital flight 
                                                 
4  Carried out for instance by manipulating transfer prices of exports and imports: see e.g. 
Zdanowicz, Pak, & Sullivan, 1999; de Boyrie, Pak, & Zdanowicz, 2004; Pak, 2006. 
5  A more recent treatment of some of these themes is provided by Palan, 2003. 
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occurring simultaneously with foreign borrowing that, in effect, socializes the accumulation of 
offshore assets by private firms and individuals, who are the only actors with that option.  As 
Weeks subsequently noted: “The passive acceptance of debt service by most Latin American 
governments requires a class analysis to be explained: the upper classes incurred the debt, while 
for the most part the lower classes paid it off” (Weeks, 1995, p. 126).   
Debt-financed accumulation of wealth by elites, for which mechanisms to facilitate 
capital flight are a prerequisite, is a long-standing problem. For example at the end of 2001, 
while Argentina was undergoing an economic collapse that saw the peso lose more than 60 
percent of its value against the US dollar and GDP decline by 11 percent in 2002, it was 
estimated that the value of assets held abroad by Argentine residents equaled the total value of 
the country’s foreign debt (Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, 2003).  Subsequently, The 
Economist (Anon, 2005) suggested that this would be true even after taking into account the 
effects of a settlement negotiated between the Argentine government and its creditors on terms 
relatively favourable to Argentina.  The problem has also been identified in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), a region that includes many of the world’s poorest countries: Ndikumana & Boyce (2003) 
calculated that between 1970 and 1996, “roughly 80 cents on every dollar that flowed into the 
region from foreign loans flowed back out as capital flight in the same year” (p. 122, emphasis 
added).  Capital flight thus contributed to Africa’s status in the late 1990s as the region of the 
developing world whose residents held the highest proportion of their private wealth outside the 
region (Collier, Hoeffler, & Pattillo, 2001).  More recent calculations (Boyce & Ndikumana, 
2008) put the value of capital flight from 40 SSA countries between 1970 and 2004, including 
imputed interest earnings, at $607 billion – a figure that is roughly three times the value of those 
countries’ external debt obligations.  Using similar methods, Beja (2006) estimated the 
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accumulated value of flight capital from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand over 
the period 1970-2000 at $1 trillion; the flight in question occurred not only during periods of 
financial crisis, as might have been expected, but also during periods of economic growth and 
stability.  And Loungani & Mauro (2001) estimated the value of capital flight from Russia post-
1994 at $15-20 billion per year, or approximately $100-$150 per capita. This figure is nothing 
short of astonishing when compared with Russia’s GDP/capita of $1770 in 2000, and although 
the hypothetical may be implausible one nevertheless wonders how much less painful and 
health-destructive the Russian experience of the last 15 years (Field, Kotz, & Bukhman, 2000; 
Shkolnikov et al., 2004) might have been if the country’s newly minted multimillionaires had 
somehow been prevented from shifting their wealth abroad during the 1990s.   
This discussion leads to several tentative conclusions.  From the practical perspective of 
development policy, generic measures to curb capital flight, which have themselves proved 
elusive, may need to be complemented by specific accountability mechanisms attached to debt 
cancellation and development assistance if they are to be effective in meeting basic health-
related needs -- assuming, for the sake of argument, that this is in fact the objective sought by 
donors.  Otherwise, the fungibility of finance may mean that resources in question simply 
continue to be appropriated by elites for their own enrichment.  From the analytical perspective 
of political economy, similarities between the opportunity structures and actions of foreign and 
domestic investors underscore the extent to which financial capital has become stateless, at least 
in the sense that the citizenship or country of residence of its owners is a poor predictor both of 
portfolio choices and of political allegiances. The immediate operational significance of this 
observation is that although it is analytically convenient to discuss capital flight as a distinct 
phenomenon, the policy impacts of capital flight are all but indistinguishable from those of 
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“disengagement” by foreign investors – a point that was succinctly acknowledged by Ernesto 
Zedillo in 1987, before he moved on from the Bank of Mexico to a higher-profile job (Zedillo, 
1987, p. 178).   
 
5.  Globalization, domestic politics and SDH 
 
Further complicating the picture, one cannot presume that conditionalities dictated by financial 
markets or multilateral institutions represent the most serious constraint on domestic policy 
choices.  Even leaving aside the cases of governments that are frankly predatory in their quest to 
enrich leading political figures and their allies,6 such choices must be understood in terms of a 
complex interplay between domestic class structures and allegiances (including, for instance, the 
alliances or shared interests of ‘domestic’ and international investors) and such external 
constraints, always mediated by domestic political institutions.  Domestic class structures and 
possibilities for political action are in turn influenced by multiple elements of globalization, 
perhaps most conspicuously the worldwide reorganization of production across multiple national 
borders in what the World Bank has called an “open production environment” that “mercilessly 
                                                 
6  In recent experience such cases conspicuously include resource-rich African countries such as 
Nigeria, Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire).  Predatory rulers 
are aided by financial institutions that facilitate capital flight (Ndikumana & Boyce, 1998; 
Jerome, 2005; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008) and provide abundant opportunities to conceal the 
true ownership of assets, and by an international community that rarely questions a “borrowing 
privilege” that permits even the most corrupt and repressive rulers to incur debts that their 
subjects will be called upon to repay (Pogge, 2002).    
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weeds out those centers with below-par macroeconomic environments, services, and labor-
market flexibility” (World Bank, 1999, p. 50).  Against this background, postwar compromises 
between capital and labour in many high-income countries are crumbling and may be difficult to 
replicate elsewhere in the world, because the class tensions that such compromises historically 
addressed need no longer be resolved within national borders.  Rather, they now play out against 
a background of the dramatic increase in labour supply associated with integration of much of 
the population of India, China and the transition economies into the global labour force 
(Bronfenbrenner & Luce, 2004; Woodall, 2006; Freeman, 2007) and implicit or explicit threats 
of disinvestment, capital flight and relocation of production to lower-cost jurisdictions.   
A further dynamic, the importance of which has almost certainly been underestimated, is 
the effect on political allegiances of increases in economic inequality within national economies, 
driven by the divergent labour market prospects of the more and less ‘skilled’ (see e.g. Reich, 
1991; Nickell & Bell, 1995; World Bank, 2007, p. 67-100).  This has interrelated material and 
cognitive dimensions.  The former are exemplified by the expansion of a ‘middle class’ in many 
low- and middle-income countries, which may or may not share economic interests with the less 
fortunate segments of the population that still constitute a majority.  The latter are suggested by 
the observation of veteran Belgian politician Frank Vandenbroucke that “[t]o the extent that skill 
has become more important as an explanatory factor of quite visible wage inequalities, such 
inequalities come to have a more ‘biographical’ character: they seem to be more related to 
personal history and qualifications than to class as traditionally understood” (Vandenbroucke, 
1998, p. 47).  
 Detailed exploration of these issues requires country-specific analyses that cannot be 
undertaken here.  Their importance for understanding policies that affect SDH can be illustrated 
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by way of a stylized, necessarily superficial discussion of recent social policy initiatives and their 
limitations in Brazil, Chile and Mexico. To some extent, the case example is opportunistically 
chosen based on the availability of recent research. However, it is also useful to note that both 
Brazil and Mexico experienced recent financial crises, preceded by long periods of structural 
adjustment.  Chile experienced an earlier and more violent variant of market-oriented social 
restructuring in the aftermath of the 1973 military coup; the importance of this ‘softening-up’ for 
Chile’s subsequent trajectory is often ignored by contemporary authors.  In each case, external 
influences contributed to the appeal of neoliberal policies to domestic constituencies as the only 
ones that ‘worked’.7 
Recent social policy innovation has emphasized conditional cash transfers, or CCTs: 
programs of small, means-tested cash transfers to the desperately poor (Mexico’s Oportunidades, 
Brazil’s Bolsa Família, and Chile Solidario) that are tied to performance on such measures as 
ensuring school attendance, health checkups for children, or keeping children out of child labour. 
Among the advantages claimed for such programs is that, unlike many more conventional social 
protection mechanisms, they ensure that scarce resources will benefit those most in need and 
give priority to children (e.g. rather than the elderly, as in the case of pensions).  Latin American 
CCTs have led to short-term improvements in health indicators (Gertler, 2004; Lagarde, Haines, 
& Palmer, 2007) and modest reductions in poverty and economic inequality (Soares, Guerreiro 
Osório, & Costa, 2007), albeit from historically high levels (in most countries in the region) that 
were exacerbated by two decades of economic integration.  However, some researchers warn that 
their longer term impact is likely to be limited in the absence of policy attention to such basic 
                                                 
7  See Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002 for a discussion of neoliberalism in Mexico and Chile 
that is insightful in many respects, but pays insufficient attention to such influences. 
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determinants of livelihood as employment opportunities (Parrado, 2005; Hall, 2006; Molyneux, 
2007; Teichman, 2008), lest young people’s opportunities continue to be limited “to the lower 
rungs of the metropolitan labour markets” (Molyneux, 2007, p. 73).  Ideologically, CCTs’ 
emphasis on targeting the ‘poorest of the poor’ to enhance their children’s human capital 
(Molyneux, 2006; Hall, 2006) is thoroughly congruent with an individualistic, market-oriented 
policy vision that expects even the poorest to earn their way out of poverty, however unrealistic 
that may be given globalization’s effects on labour markets.  A further, related presumption is 
that poor households require incentives to avoid a “culture of dependency”8 and need 
“supervision” if they are to behave appropriately,9 thereby assigning primary responsibility for 
poverty to the poor – a core theme of neoliberal discourse in poor societies and rich alike10 – 
rather than to structurally entrenched inequalities and the power relations that sustain them.    
In an analysis that is exemplary in its attention to the interplay of external and domestic 
constraints, Teichman, (2008) situates Mexican and Chilean CCTs in a political context that 
includes not only the prospect of capital flight but also labour movements that have been 
seriously weakened by globalization (cf. Hershberg, 2007), and in Mexico the ongoing costs of a 
huge publicly financed bailout of politically well connected bankers during the 1995 financial 
crisis.  She observes that “resisters to a new redistributive settlement may include not just the 
business community, but also upper and middle-income groups … along with technocratic allies 
                                                 
8 In the words of a laudatory article in The Economist (Anon, 2008). 
9 In the words of an unpublished Brazilian evaluation cited by Hall (2006, p. 25). 
10 Cf. the title of the 1996 legislation that dismantled income support under the Aid to Families 
for Dependent Children program in the United States: the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (emphases added).  
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within the state” (p. 447) whose links with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development 
Bank were forged during the era of structural adjustment (Teichman, 2007).  At best, Teichman 
concludes, CCTs “are able to garner a very grudging societal consensus” that falls far short of 
support for “sufficiently redistributive policy outcomes” (Teichman, 2008, p. 456).  
 A broadly similar analysis would appear applicable to Brazil, where the 2002 concession 
to IMF standards of macroeconomic management has been identified as crucial to the ability of 
the PT’s presidential candidate, Luiz Inácio (Lula) da Silva, to appeal successfully to a diverse 
electoral coalition that included some highly privileged elements of Brazilian society (Morais & 
Saad-Filho, 2005).  Lula’s reelection in 2006, in which he was able to consolidate his appeal to 
some of the poorest Brazilians – a success that was not reflected in the PT’s legislative standings 
– has been attributed in part to the benefits conferred on these marginalized constituencies by 
Bolsa Família (Hunter & Power, 2007).  However, reflecting the precariousness of support for 
progressive social policies in Brazil, in December 2007 the country’s Senate voted against 
renewing the tax on financial transactions that provided a substantial part of the funding for 
Bolsa Família. At the time it was envisioned that this loss might be offset at least temporarily by 
the solid revenue situation of the Brazilian government as a result of strong economic growth 
(Alvares de Azevedo e Almeida, 2008), but the economic events of 2008 called that prospect 
into question.    
The point here, to recapitulate, is that external pressures from financial markets cannot be 
assumed to constitute the limiting constraint on contemporary economic social policy even under 
definitions of formal democracy; this question can only be answered on a case-specific basis.  
However, it is important to focus attention not only on contemporary class structures and 
22 
 
political allegiances, but also on their historical underpinnings; and there, we may find that 
pressure from financial markets has been very important indeed. 
  
6.  Concluding thoughts:  What did September, 2008 change?  
   
The financial crisis that burst into the open in 2008 showed that any serious discussion of social 
determinants of health must include reference to the operations of financial markets, and 
confirmed the wisdom of earlier observations that identified financial stability, in particular 
avoidance of financial crises, as one of a limited number of genuinely global public goods 
(GPGs), and one that is seriously undersupplied by existing institutions (Griffith-Jones, 2003).  
Innovative mechanisms to increase the supply of this public good had been proposed (see e.g. 
Eichengreen, 2004); some appeared relatively simple conceptually although requiring high levels 
of coordination and shared objectives among multiple national governments.   
 In some respects, the crisis resembled episodes like those discussed earlier in the chapter 
in its demonstration of global interconnectedness, and of the destructive effects that events 
originating in the financial system can have on the livelihoods of those who are far removed, in 
both geographical and economic terms.  However, in contrast to those episodes, at least in its 
earlier stages the crisis did not appear to reflect rational choices by investors about the risks 
associated with a particular national economic environment or policy direction.  Instead, it 
resulted from a disregard of financial risk by investors and regulators in one country (the United 
States) that has to be regarded as at least partly irrational, in conjunction with a longer-term 
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tendency to relax regulation of the domestic financial services industry11 and to neglect 
enforcement even of those regulations and quasi-official standards that remained in place.  The 
collapses at the start of the decade of firms like Enron and WorldCom, as a result of accounting 
practices that were unquestionably fraudulent, were an earlier result of the domestic deregulatory 
impulse.12  US firms and regulatory institutions were not of course the only culprits, but it is fair 
to say that financial deregulation in the United States was a necessary cause of the events of 
2008.  Stated another way, the crisis is best understood with reference to the absence of any 
institutions of governance capable of preventing the United States from wrecking a substantial 
portion of its own financial system, with massive negative externalities that quickly spread 
within its own economy and around the world, revealing what the Bank of England with 
masterful understatement referred to as “underappreciated, but potent, interconnections between 
firms in the global financial system” (Bank of England, 2008, p. 9). 
For many developing economies, the combination of declining demand for exports with 
the prospect of disinvestment and capital flight may lead to the undoing of recent, modest gains 
in reducing poverty and economic insecurity followed by a lost decade of development progress.  
As in previous periods of economic adjustment in response to externally generated adversities, 
negative health effects could be compounded by domestic austerity measures; it is not clear that 
                                                 
11  On the relation between deregulation and the spread of securitization, which was a key 
contributor to the increased vulnerability of financial institutions, see Soederberg, 2004, p. 98-
100; United Nations Conference, 2009, p. 8-11.  For a more general commentary on the role of 
US deregulation, see Kapadia & Jayadev, 2008. 
12  For a useful summary of these developments and a critique of subsequent legislative 
responses, see Skeel, 2005. 
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development assistance providers will be willing and able to compensate for such measures, 
given pressures to prioritize economic recovery within their own borders, or to address urgent 
contemporaneous health-related issues such as a food production crisis that arguably results from 
long-term underinvestment in developing country agriculture (United Nations Conference, 2009, 
p. 26-27).  By November 2008, on a conservative estimate high-income countries had committed 
at least $5 trillion in cash and credit guarantees to bail out collapsing firms and provide economic 
stimuli in the hope of offsetting the effects of the crisis (Gee, 2008).13  Unless the resumption of 
growth is rapid and robust, it is possible that few of these costs will be recovered through tax 
revenues, raising the prospect of public sector budget constraints that persist long after the 
immediate crisis because of accumulated debt burdens.  National governments in high-income 
countries could increase the possibility of recovering costs using a range of strategies, such as 
demanding preferred shares that can be converted to equity as the price of rescues.  They could 
in theory insist on accountability of rescued firms in terms of social objectives, or at the very 
least demonstrable contributions to economic recovery, as well as financial viability.  At this 
writing, it is not clear that they will attempt to do so; indeed, it is not clear that they have the 
necessary bargaining power given the consequences (for instance) of financial system collapse of 
a kind that was at least temporarily averted in September, 2008.  As noted in Le Monde 
Diplomatique, the power relations that led to the financial commitments made then were 
essentially those of a hostage taking, with the livelihoods of millions hanging in the balance 
                                                 
13  As the United States’ contribution, this estimate included only the $700 billion value of the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program approved by Congress.  This was only a small part of the total 
value of subsidies and credit guarantees provided by the US government, estimated for 
Bloomberg News later in November at $7.7 trillion (Pittman & Ivry, 2008). 
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(Lordon, 2008).  A further question involves the extent to which governments are limited not by 
the bargaining power of firms seeking rescue, but rather by a legacy of received neoliberal 
economic policy wisdom that is implacably hostile to direct public ownership, on the grounds of 
its purported inefficiency and market-distorting effects. 
In the international frame of reference, the crisis has lent urgency to arguments not only 
for reform of financial regulation (see e.g. D'Arista & Griffith-Jones, 2008), but also for broader 
efforts “to create a truly inclusive system of global economic governance” (United Nations 
Conference, 2009, p. 32).  It remains to be seen how seriously such arguments will be taken, 
although the body of knowledge about SDH can be a compelling source of evidentiary support.  
Powerful nations like the United States, responding to fierce resistance from their own financial 
services industries, will probably be reluctant to relinquish enough control over their policies to 
enable meaningful international financial regulation possible, however strong the intellectual 
case for doing so.  More fundamentally, it remains to be seen whether serious potential exists for 
going beyond calls for coordinated macroeconomic management, which requires few challenges 
to the values of the marketplace, to the more fundamental reform of reorienting the priorities of 
economic management itself around what the chair of CSDH has called “a vision of the world 
where people matter and social justice is paramount” (Marmot, 2005, p. 1099).  The events of 
2008 underscored the importance of that vision for a world in which all have the opportunity to 
lead long and healthy lives.  If such a vision is to be realized, where will the necessary leadership 
come from?    
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